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I. FOREWORD
After the Revolutionary War, the crown lands in the U.S. became the
"original public domain," and from that the status of "federal lands" was
derived. This is accurate history, but not complete, because it ignores the
prior occupancy of the land by Native Americans.
Initially by indifference and eventually by force, Native Americans and
their land institutions were overridden and displaced. Patricia Limerick has
correctly described this not as settlement, but as conquest in her text, The
Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West. We have
federal lands today because the lands were taken in violence. This much
can be said about such regrettable history: we cannot ignore it, and we must
not forget it.
* "[The Author] ... has spent his adult life immersed in the subject matter of.
[public lands], by virtue of his vocational and leisure-time choices. After 6 years
of service in Alaska's national forests, he earned a Ph.D. in Wildland Resource
Science at the University of California, Berkeley, and for 12 years taught natural
resource policy at the University of Montana. During that time, he served on the
faculty committee appointed by Dean Arnold W. Bolle to investigate, at the request
of Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana, the controversial forest management practices
on the Bitterroot National Forest. The committee's work, known quickly and
widely as the Bolle Report, was sharply critical of Forest Service practices and was
instrumental in stimulating the passage of the National Forest Management Act.
Behan left the University of Montana to join the faculty of the School of Forestry at
Northern Arizona University, and was appointed Dean of the School several years
later. He served on the boards of directors of the Forest History Society, the Ameri-
can Forestry Association, and the Council of Forestry School Executives, traveling
frequently to Washington DC and experiencing the maelstrom of influence-politics
there. He served as a consultant at various times to the U.S. Forest Service, the
National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Soil Conservation
Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Congressional Research Service,
and published nearly 100 articles and papers in the literature of public land man-
agement, economics, and politics . . ." Richard W. Behan, Plundered Promise:
Capitalism, Politics, and the Fate of the Federal Lands (Island Press 2001).
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II. INTRODUCTION
In a span of less than three decades, the Champion International Corpora-
tion came to Montana, captured huge private gains from the public lands,
and then left. On arrival, they bought about a million forested acres, virtu-
ally all of which had once been federal public lands. Then they bought most
of the milling capacity west of the Continental Divide, and proceeded to
strip the timber from their lands and from most of several national forests as
well. Finally, they put their cutover lands and their mills on the market,
found buyers, and vanished. The blasted landscapes left behind will take a
lifetime to recover, and Montana is still struggling with the externalized
social costs of the company's behavior.
Measured in terms of the economy, that behavior was no less than stellar.
Champion took the proceeds from liquidating their assets in Montana, built
a new paper mill in Michigan, and went on its profit-seeking way. Its
stockholders were delighted.
Measured in terms of civic responsibility, that behavior was appalling,
and no other nation on Earth would tolerate such a stark contrast in meas-
ured outcomes. The United States is unique in the world in the degree to
which the public good is sacrificed for the private. The reasons for this are
many and complex, but not mysterious.
In summary and in sequence:
(1) The U.S. Constitution heavily favored the interests of individualized
citizens over society at large.
(2) American corporations became legal citizens in 1887, and exercised
their Constitutional rights in an economic and social rampage at the
end of the century.
(3) These corporations were eventually regulated by a consensual pro-
gressivism in American politics, which survived until the final quar-
ter of the twentieth century.
(4) The messianic ideology of neoliberalism then arose to challenge the
progressive consensus and defeat it.
(5) And that's why Champion International could do what it did.
Innocently and understandably, the U.S. Constitution sought preemi-
nently and almost exclusively to maximize the liberty of individual citizens,
and presumed the common good would flow from that. For most of a cen-
tury, the presumption proved to be prescient: both individual citizens and
society at large prospered as never before in world history. By the closing
decades of the nineteenth century, though, a serious number of individuals
enjoying maximized liberty were not human citizens, but corporations.
Corporations in the late nineteenth century, armed with the capacity to
accumulate capital without limit, endowed with immortality, and enjoying
unprecedented prosperity and power, trampled the public good to such an
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extent they induced a sizeable and effective public outcry. A political and
sometimes violent reaction to corporate excesses soon put in place a system
of regulatory laws, among other things prohibiting the employment of chil-
dren, assuring pure food and drugs, and retaining in public federal owner-
ship, eventually, one-third of the nation's land surface. The "Age of Re-
form," as historian Richard Hofstadter called it, sought to prevent the Con-
stitution's emphasis on individual liberty from becoming mere corporate
license. The reform process and its products lasted for roughly three genera-
tions. Other notable accomplishments were the anti-trust laws, the gradu-
ated income tax, the prohibition of corporate contributions to political cam-
paigns, the franchise for women, labor laws, compulsory public education,
the civil rights laws, and the various environmental protection statutes. All
these laws sought equity in the nation's affairs, and they were successful:
the public welfare was proximately well served, with minimal impact on
liberty, either personal or corporate.
We found over a period of six or seven decades, the private good could
be pursued without compromising the public. Neither need be sacrificed to
the other, and many studies suggest that the 1950s and 60s may have been
the zenith of a just and decent public life in the U.S. We had come to agree
on a progressive public agenda.
In the 1960s, however, a small group of very wealthy, very conservative,
but very capable people looked critically at the progressive agenda, and
found its ancestry suspect and its continuity threatening. They looked back
with longing and nostalgia to the Constitution's emphasis on individual
liberty, and resuscitated a century-old argument: liberty is maximized in
free markets, and oppressed by governments.
They undertook a competent and concerted campaign to undermine not
only the accumulation of progressive public policy, but also the progressive
institutions they saw as largely responsible: the media, academia, the politi-
cal parties, the legislative and executive branches, and the judiciary. Spend-
ing millions of exquisitely focused dollars, they succeeded in mounting a
frontal attack on the nation's progressive agenda with the election of
Ronald Reagan in 1980. If government was oppressive, privatize what can
be privatized and minimize what can't. If markets promote individual lib-
erty, deregulate them. The movement came to be known as neoliberalism,
but critics see absurdity in its argument and sobering hazards in its success.
III. LIBERTY
The tension between self and society is eternal. If social domination is
taken to the limit, we get some sort of idealized commune, where the self is
abjectly subordinated. At the limit of self-domination we encounter anar-
chy, or the law of the jungle, where society is subordinated. So we exist at
some fragile, vulnerable point on a continuum between untenable extremes.
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At one of those points there can indeed be an oppressive government.
The American Revolutionaries thought they saw one in the British Crown,
so after the war, they wrote a Constitution tilting heavily toward the self-
domination end of the spectrum to maximize individual liberty. The Found-
ing Fathers were neither indifferent to, nor unaware of, the need to assure
the greater public welfare. To do so, as Daniel Kemmis points out in Com-
munity and the Politics of Place, they invoked in their thinking a conven-
ient political counterpart of Adam Smith's "invisible hand." The good of
the nation would flow automatically, in political as well as economic terms,
from the pursuit of self-interest. Community would emerge from liberty.
Thinking carefully about the Constitution, however, we discover that the
Founding Fathers made a careful distinction between two sorts of liberty.
They provided generously for economic liberty--citizens could pursue their
material, physical welfare without an oppressive government restraining
them. But political liberty-the right to participate fully in democratic self-
governance-was something else again, and here the Founding Fathers
were parsimonious indeed. With deliberation, with ingenuity, and with al-
most impregnable success, they made democracy impossible.
Consensus is everywhere and always unlikely to be achieved, so most
democratic societies settle for rule by majority: they seek to do what is best
for most of their citizens. For this to happen, two conditions must be met: a
majority must be mobilized and recognized, and it must be given a voice.
The majority must be visible, and we need to know what it wants. Only
then can we know that public policy serves the majority will.
Many nations meet these conditions. They display a single source of po-
litical power that is subject to "capture" by a majority. And their strong
political parties, mobilizing and giving voice to prospective majorities, con-
test with one another to affect the capture. The parliamentary government
of Great Britain is such a system. As head of the successful party, the Prime
Minister controls the legislative branch and is simultaneously the chief ex-
ecutive. There is no separation of powers, and British courts cannot nullify
an act of Parliament. Thus, the office of Prime Minister represents an enor-
mous concentration of political power, and the partisan contest to capture it
is lively. The parties each write a "programme" of prospective public pol-
icy, hoping to attract a majority of voters. After the election, the majority is
visible, and what it wants is provided in the immediate adoption of the win-
ning party's "programme."
If you wanted to prevent democracy, as the aristocratic Founding Fathers
conspicuously did, you would make it impossible for political power-the
government-to be "captured" by any conceivable means. You might scat-
ter political power through both space and time. You could separate the
executive branch from a bicameral legislature, and you could anticipate a
Supreme Court with the power of judicial review. No political party would
find it easy to capture all four pieces. If you thought it might, you could put
time barriers in the way: elect representatives at two year intervals, the
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president at four, and senators at six, with Supreme Court justices serving
for life. Still wary, you could disperse the mechanisms of choice; only the
Representatives would be chosen by popular election, senators would be
picked by state legislators, the president by an electoral college, and the
Supreme Court staffed by presidential appointment. Then you could emas-
culate the political parties. Parties were clearly in evidence before, and dur-
ing, the Constitutional Convention, but they were paid the ultimate insult of
indifference: parties are nowhere even mentioned in the document. And
finally, the Founding Fathers could take comfort in a telling statistic: for
97.5% of the American people at the time, voting was illegal.
It took seven generations to rectify all the elements of that statistic, until
the voting rights acts of the 1960s. Those who were not white, or yet
twenty-one, those without property, and those who were not male, eventu-
ally were granted the right to cast a ballot. In a critically important respect,
however, their victories were hollow, and those who always voted are no
better off. For voting and representative democracy are not simple equiva-
lents. Nor is voting even necessary: the archetypal democracy of ancient
Greece chose its governing representatives by lottery. Voting simply identi-
fies and empowers the peoples' agents or proxies. For representative de-
mocracy to function legitimately, those agents--collectively, "the govern-
ment"-must be always and directly accountable to the voters. On this
score, the U.S. Constitution fails miserably.
Because the Constitution balkanized both political power and the Ameri-
can electorate, the totality of the federal government is accountable to no
one. A representative is accountable to his or her district, and there are 435
representatives. A senator is accountable to his or her state, and there are
100 senators. Only the president has a national constituency, so the presi-
dent at least is accountable to the nation. But the president, in stark contrast
to most prime ministers, does not characterize, "the government" (it is com-
monplace to speak of "the Blair Government" in Britain, or the "Chretien
Government" in Canada). No, the U.S. "government" includes those other
535 people, not a single one of whom is accountable to the nation. We can
no more expect a comprehensive "accountability" from our federal gov-
ernment than we can identify a majority that empowered it: indeed, we are
looking at two faces of a single coin here.
Serious scrutiny has only recently addressed this problem. First in time
was Daniel Lazare's book, The Frozen Republic: How the Constitution is
Paralyzing Democracy, appearing in 1996. In 2001, political scientist
Robert Dahl asked in the title of his book, How Democratic is the American
Constitution? Dahl answers: not very.
Consider again the contrast: the Blair Government in Britain is directly
accountable to the majority that elected it, and stands in constant jeopardy
of being "toppled" if it strays too far from what the majority wants. Our
Constitutional government never has been and cannot be "toppled" this way
because it escapes, in its totality, any measure of electorate accountability.
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This is not to say that the disparate elements of the U.S. government cannot
be captured at all, nor to deny a derelict form of accountability. In an age of
hugely expensive political campaigns, candidates are susceptible to capture
by prominent contributors, and accountability follows as surely as night
succeeds day. We will revisit this difficulty.
The Constitution is the genesis of America's propensity to sacrifice the
public good in favor of private gain. It encouraged and provided liberty in
the economic realm, while obliterating it in the political realm. It is scarcely
surprising that citizens devoted their energies and ingenuity to the pursuit of
private wealth.
IV. PROSPERITY
As the nineteenth century progressed, you could have written an equa-
tion: free land + free markets + free men = unprecedented prosperity, indi-
vidually and collectively. Westward lay a continent of breathtaking natural
wealth and limitless opportunity, except for one unfortunate reality: it was
fully occupied by sophisticated people with a trade and transportation infra-
structure hemispheric in reach, with cities larger than London or Paris, and
with eighteen centuries of demonstrated success in sustainable existence.
What these people didn't have was the institution of private property
rights in land. But Thomas Jefferson did, which led him to do two things.
First, he articulated his vision for the fledgling nation: liberty would be
sustained in a country of rugged individual and independent farmers, "se-
cure in their property." Second, he pursued his vision in public policy by
executing the Louisiana Purchase, to assure sufficient land for a growing
population of agrarian yeomen.
If private property was alien to the continent's original inhabitants, so
were gunpowder, the wheel, and smallpox. The combination of all three in
the hands of the U.S. military was devastating. Tribal lands across the con-
tinent were taken in violence and became the "original public domain" of
the immigrant Americans. This domain would not remain "public" for long.
The public good flowed from private prosperity, so government land shifted
into private ownership as rapidly as orderly development (and speculation,
fraud and theft) would allow.
Most of the enterprises undertaken in this period-family farms, pick and
shovel mining operations, sawmills, and livestock ranches-could be han-
dled as proprietorships. The call for capital investment could be met with
the savings and available credit of the individual entrepreneurs.
However, not so for the transcontinental railroads. Here was a classic
need to accumulate capital into far larger pools. Here was a need for the
corporate form of enterprise. Corporations were not unknown even in colo-
nial times. They were often chartered to build transportation facilities, such
as a barge canal or a toll road, and they were strictly limited and constantly
scrutinized. The corporations were project-specific and subject to finite life
(Vol. 24
DEGENERATE DEMOCRACY
spans, typically twenty years. Stockholders were liable for corporate mis-
deeds, and the charters were revocable for behavior deemed to violate the
public interest. Not a few were so revoked. The early corporations were
clearly subordinate to, and in the service of, the society that created them.
But even so, they were early and often stigmatized for their potential social
mischief. Thomas Jefferson worried in detail and in print about the malign
potential of the "moneyed corporations." So did James Madison, Abraham
Lincoln and a long line of other public figures.
These concerns were well placed. As the century wore on, corporations
sought, primarily through the courts, to loosen these social constraints.
Charters became generalized, not specific to a particular project or enter-
prise. Corporations came to be chartered "in perpetuity." Stockholders'
liability was eventually limited to the value of their holdings. Charter revo-
cations became ever more difficult.
The dominant corporations in the nineteenth century were the great rail-
road companies. As early as mid-century, they identified and pursued a
legal accommodation of stupendous benefit. Long identified as "fictitious
persons" the railroads sought to be deemed legal persons, with all the rights
and privileges enjoyed by human, sentient citizens, including full constitu-
tional protection under the Bill of Rights.
By taking one trivial lawsuit after another all the way to the Supreme
Court, they were eventually successful. Today, corporate campaign contri-
butions are considered a form of free speech. Corporate lobbying is an ex-
ercise of the right to petition. Corporations have avoided site inspections by
regulatory agencies on the grounds of privacy-invasion. By virtue of "cor-
porate personhood" and the accompanying constitutional rights, corpora-
tions today have escaped any meaningful social oversight and containment.
Mergers and acquisitions were once prohibited (by a law later found uncon-
stitutional), but corporations now grow ever larger, more powerful, and
transnational, rampaging the world. They are institutions of economic and
political power unprecedented in human history.
Among the law schools addressing this matter, and in countless history
books, corporate personhood is said to have been granted in a Supreme
Court decision in 1886. The schools and books are all in serious error. The
case was Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394
(1886). This was one of those trivial lawsuits; it had to do with the taxation
of fences. In the written decision of that case, however, there is not a single
word about corporate personhood, or the Fourteenth Amendment, which the
railroad attorneys hoped to have applied in the case. Nothing. The Supreme
Court decided the case in favor of the Southern Pacific, as it turned out, on
entirely different grounds.
Two years later, in Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Mackey, 127
U.S. 205 (1888), the Supreme Court "conceded" corporate personhood,
citing Santa Clara County. Early the next year, in Minneapolis & St. Louis
Railway Company v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889), the Court said corpo-
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rate personhood had been "so held" in Santa Clara County. By 1898, the
Supreme Court had cited Santa Clara County in eight cases. A sizeable
body of case law was developing to give the nineteenth century railroads-
and all corporations thereafter-legal personhood; but it was built on a
void. The written decision in Santa Clara County did not address the issue
at all.
What happened in Santa Clara County? In a verbal discussion before
reading the formal decision, Chief Justice Waite said the Court had not
wanted to hear arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to corpo-
rations. "We are all of the opinion that it does," he said, but the Court in
fact had decided the case on other grounds. In the headnote to the case, the
court reporter dutifully noted Waite's spoken words, "we are all of the
opinion that it does." And that, apparently, is what subsequent Court deci-
sions cited. But headnotes establish no precedent. Only formal court deci-
sions do that. Corporate personhood has no legitimate legal basis.
That didn't matter much in the late 1800s, when corporations undertook
their first unrestrained rampage of exploitation through the landscapes,
natural resources, and social institutions of the country. The Constitution's
encouragement of private gain was manifested as corporate gain, and if the
courts failed to see the difference between corporate citizens and human
citizens, others did not. A great popular and political uprising challenged
the corporate savaging of labor (think children), the environment (think cut
out and get out), and markets (think monopolies). Real and effective re-
forms followed.
You could say the public was finding its political voice, to define and
pursue the public good, and finally an astonishing transformation in public
land policy was achieved. For 100 years the public land had been privat-
ized, always and everywhere. Then by conscious political choice, first in
Yellowstone National Park and then in the nation's public forest lands, pri-
vatization was stopped. The value of publicness gained traction in the body
politic.
V. EQUITY
The Constitution made democracy impossible-it provided what might
charitably be called a benevolent plutocracy-but the American people
wouldn't take "no" for an answer. First we tried working through political
parties. At the time of ratification, there were two. Washington, Adams, and
Hamilton represented the Federalist Party, which, in a sense, stood in the
terms we've been using here, for "publicness." If there was to be a single
nation, then there had to be a strong, centralized government. Such a gov-
ernment was also necessary to protect and promote commercial, financial,
manufacturing, and trade interests of the new nation-the business interests
of the country-and thus the Republican Party was born.
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On the other side of the aisle stood Jefferson and Madison, leaders of the
party already known as the Republicans (the semantic confusion would be
straightened out later). These Republicans felt strongly about "privateness,"
that individual liberty had been oppressed by the British Crown and it might
be again by a strong centralized federal government. "That government is
best," Jefferson is alleged to have written, "which governs least." Clearly
that's a tilt toward anarchy. The Republicans championed the common citi-
zen, the farmers and mechanics, the small independent shopkeepers, the
workers of the nation, and thus the Democratic Party was born. By the time
Jefferson read his inaugural address, he listed himself as a "Democratic
Republican," so the shift in nomenclature was halfway completed.
As the parties grew and developed in the country, they had to confront an
unyielding structure: the U.S. Constitution. Balkanized government and a
balkanized electorate prevented (and still do) the parties from mobilizing a
majority and giving it a voice. Yes, they could hold national conventions
and yes, they could write and adopt party "platforms" of prospective public
policy. But there was no disciplined way for them to transform a party plat-
form into law, even if their party claimed the White House and both cham-
bers of Congress simultaneously. The President might be looking to the
nation at large, but everyone else was focused on his constituency back
home. The parties, in short, had (and still have) essentially no capacity to
shape public policy.
So the parties pursue what they can do: recruit and campaign the drama-
tis personae of government. It's a personnel management function. We
could call it "people politics." The party system granted to the American
people at least some access to their government. They could choose the
political actors, anyway. But the people still had no access to the process of
formulating and forming public policy. The Constitution had the last laugh;
democracy seemed indeed to have found the Constitution almost impregna-
ble.
So we tried another end run, inventing the peculiar American institution
of the political interest group. As early as 1825, Alexis de Tocqueville mar-
veled at our propensity for "associations" and their use in the political proc-
ess. Initially defensive in nature-protesting something Congress had
done-interest groups soon learned to play offense, and by the end of the
nineteenth century they were adept at submitting policy proposals of their
own. They also became adept at seeing them enacted. We call that "lobby-
ing," and for most of its history, lobbying has been an honorable, just, and
decent way for American people to participate in the public policy process.
The system of countervailing interest groups could be called "policy
politics," and in 1965 Professor Charles Lindblom explained how it works
in a book called, The Intelligence of Democracy. Interest groups, acting in
their own best interest, engage in "partisan mutual adjustment," interacting
and compromising to construct public policy that can, and normally does,
serve the broad public interest. James Madison would have been tickled to
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read Lindblom's book. It confirmed what Madison had asserted: in the po-
litical realm, if people are free to act in their own best interest, the social
optimum will be achieved.
In the years arbitrarily from 1890 until say, 1975, America found not
only its political voice but also its political muscle, and cracked the Consti-
tution's defenses against democracy. Yes, there was still a great deal of
private use of the public lands, but it was regulated and overseen by profes-
sional and largely non political land managing agencies. "Environmental"
groups and "commodity" groups engaged in Lindblom's partisan mutual
adjustment, to produce such notable and well-balanced laws as the Wilder-
ness Act of 1964.
These sanguine times and civil behavior were made possible by a visible
consensus on progressive public policy. A specific and focused example
was a statement by Richard Nixon: "we're all Keynesians now." The public
interest did count, but it was neither absolute nor oppressive. Individual
welfare was important, but it should not trump the well being of society at
large. We were a plural society of strong minds, yes, but also of open minds
and even of fairly big hearts. We would become what one observer has
called a "society of sharp elbows."
VI. ABSURDITY
The progressive consensus could be challenged and overcome by deter-
mined opponents, given three conditions: they had to have an alternative
ideology that was coherent and marketable, they had to be patient, and they
would need a lot of money. Milton Friedman brought the ideology into fo-
cus with his book in 1962, Capitalism and Freedom. He dusted off an old
argument-the "liberal" argument of the late 1800s-that "liberty" is pro-
vided only in free, capitalistic markets, and governments are oppressive. It
rested on Adam Smith's vision of 200 years ago: willing buyers and willing
sellers bargaining in free markets, and with only their self interest in mind,
would collectively generate a socially optimum state of affairs, "as if by an
invisible hand." That was an appealing argument, and Friedman's rendition
was too, at least in some quarters.
A messianic conviction grew that the progressive consensus was wrong
and dangerous. We had to turn back toward "free market solutions," in a
word, privatize and reject government mechanisms of "command and con-
trol," in another word, deregulate. The conviction, the arguments to support
it, and the movement to advance it we know today as "neoliberalism," a
term historically accurate, but misleading. Neoliberalism is archconserva-
tive to the core, and it has taken on a quasi-religious cast that some have
described as "market theology." It is a gargantuan absurdity.
The "free market" so cherished by neoliberals and so described by Adam
Smith 200 years ago has long since vanished. Markets are no longer driven
by the free bargaining of willing participants, but by policy. Sometimes it is
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public policy, but always there is a corporate policy driving the markets,
with administered prices, restricted supplies, and other powerful mecha-
nisms. Only the truly devout or tragically deluded will deny the reality of
corporate-dominated markets. But the truly devout have prevailed.
The neoliberal conviction is held so strongly by twelve right wing philan-
thropies that they set out in concert during the 1960s to overturn a century's
accumulation of progressive policy. They are the Lynde and Harry Bradley
Foundation, the Carthage Foundation, the Earhart Foundation, the Charles
G. Koch, David H. Koch and Claude R. Lambe charitable foundations, the
Phillip M. McKenna Foundation, the JM Foundation, the John M. Olin
Foundation, the Henry Salvatori Foundation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation,
and the Smith Richardson Foundation. In a well-orchestrated and coordi-
nated program, these foundations have spent hundreds of millions to ad-
vance and emplace the neoliberal agenda. They had the money and they
were patient. Let's call them the Diligent Dozen.
In How Conservative Philanthropies and Think Tanks Transform U.S.
Policy, Sally Covington has written a telling expose of this campaign, and
this is her observation:
Over the last [few] decades the [twelve] have mounted an
impressively coherent and concerted effort to shape public
policy by undermining and ultimately redirecting what they
regard as the institutional strongholds of modern American
liberalism: academia, Congress, the judiciary, executive
branch agencies, major media, religious institutions and
philanthropy itself.
Notable and conspicuous beneficiaries of this effort are the Heritage Foun-
dation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Cato Institute, all in the
nation's capital, and all funded by the Diligent Dozen since 1985 alone,
with more than $88 million. The impact of these three think tanks is huge:
they have influenced or crafted virtually the entire programs of both domes-
tic and foreign policy for the George W. Bush Administration. President
Bush's brother, Jeb, serves on the Board of Trustees of the Heritage Foun-
dation. Vice President Cheney's wife, Lynn, is a senior staffer at the
American Enterprise Institute, and twenty other AEI staffers now serve in
the Bush Administration. Notable among them is Richard Perle, one of the
chief architects of the radical new foreign policy of "preemption." President
Bush boosted that policy and its first application, the invasion of Iraq, at
AEI's Annual Dinner on February 28, 2003. The American Enterprise Insti-
tute was proud to have on its Board of Directors Mr. Kenneth Lay, the per-
sonal and corporate patron of first governor and then President George W.
Bush, and sometimes CEO of the Enron Corporation.
Mr. Lay also has close links with the Cato Institute, the most conspicu-
ous champion of privatizing Social Security. Both Mr. Lay and Enron have
been generous supporters of the Mercatus Center at George Mason Univer-
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sity, an organization devoted to neoliberal/liberatarian thought. Dr. Wendy
Gramm, the wife of former Texas Senator Phil Gramm, served on the staff
there until early in 2003, and was a Director of the Enron Corporation si-
multaneously. The primary benefactor of Mercatus, however, is the Charles
G. Koch Charitable Foundation, which provides about 37% of its budget,
and over the years has contributed $16 million. Charles Koch was also the
co-founder of the Cato Institute, and his brother, David, is currently a
member of Cato's Board of Directors. So closely allied in funding and
thought are the two organizations that staffers at George Mason University
refer to the "Mercato Institute," and not a few Ph.D.s from Mercatus went
on to work at Cato.
The Kochs are co-owners of Koch Industries of Wichita, Kansas, a mul-
tibillion-dollar privately owned oil and gas company. Both Enron and Koch
Industries have been heavy contributors to the Republican Party in general
and to the gubernatorial and presidential campaigns of George W. Bush in
particular. Enron, it might be charitably said, stubbed its toes in collecting
on its political investment, but Koch Industries did not. A $352 million law-
suit brought against the company by the Clinton Administration's Depart-
ment of Justice, for environmental violations, was dropped just three
months after George W. Bush took office. Koch industries agreed to a $20
million settlement.
Across the country are hundreds of other neoliberal organizations, a
comprehensive interlocking network funded by the Diligent Dozen, but
neoliberalism hasn't achieved this prominence overnight, and it hasn't
achieved it in isolation. Since the 1960s there has been a profound restruc-
turing of American electoral politics in two major respects. First, it has be-
come hugely expensive, because it has come to rely predominantly on net-
work television, and must compete with every commercial advertising
campaign on the airwaves. Money has never been so important.
The greatest concentrations of money in the country are found in the in-
stitutions designed to concentrate it. Today, U.S. corporations contribute
about three quarters of all campaign financing, which, in the sanguine days
of civil behavior, was illegal. The other structural change nullified that, by
legitimizing and then encouraging the explosive growth of political action
committees. This was done by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
as amended in 1974.
Corporations were now free to contribute essentially without limit to
candidates of their choice, and to say that a corporate campaign contribu-
tion has no effect on subsequent policy making is to elevate delusion to an
art form. Direct correlations between contributions and favorable policies
are child's play to document, and not a few of them relate to the corporate
plunder of the federal lands. The infamous "Salvage Rider" was just one;
the play went from Weyerheauser and Louisiana-Pacific, to Senator Slade
Gorton and back again.
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As the corporate money poured in, and as neoliberalism took hold, the
two reinforced each other, and in 1980, the movement triumphed with the
election of Ronald Reagan. Social programs were slashed on cue, the pro-
gressivity of the tax code was all but eliminated, the military-industrial
complex was handed a ballooning budget for the Pentagon, and the savings
and loan industry was deregulated, also according to script. The savings and
loan experience in letting free markets work will have cost the American
taxpayers $1.5 trillion when all the bills are paid in 2029. The public bene-
fits accruing to that expenditure, unfortunately, have been, are now, and
will ever be, exactly zero.
Minimizing government, the other half of the neoliberal formula for so-
cial success, didn't work very well for President Reagan either. His admini-
stration borrowed from future generations of taxpayers, and then lavished
on its corporate patrons, more money than all his predecessors combined,
all the way back to George Washington. The national debt when President
Reagan took office was $900 billion and change. On his departure, it stood
at $2.6 trillion, nearly three times greater. The disasters wrought by neolib-
eralism and corporate campaign financing have intensified since then. The
national debt has continued to grow relentlessly. It has more than doubled
again since President Reagan's departure, standing now at about $6.5 tril-
lion. And all the claims about "budget surpluses" have been less than hon-
est: since 1951, the debt has decreased from a previous year only once, in
2000.
Neoliberalism, promoted with exquisite success by the Diligent Dozen,
has paved the way for the corporate capture of the federal government.
Books by William Greider and Kevin Phillips, among many others, argue a
compelling case that American Democracy today is degenerate.
Neoliberalism has given us crypto-fascism instead. Public policy is no
longer fashioned by the bargaining of countervailing interest groups to ad-
vance the general welfare of the American people. Instead, it is rationalized
and crafted in neoliberal think tanks, and then fashioned to serve corporate
clients-to create, protect, or enhance the profit opportunities of campaign
contributors.
Consider, for example, the American health care system. The industry is
thriving, but the January 1999 issue of the New England Journal of Medi-
cine describes the nation's health care structure as "...the most expensive
and most inadequate health care system in the developed world." Forty-five
million Americans have no health care coverage at all, while President
Bush proposes to begin privatizing Medicare. The greater his success, the
more a company known as the Hospital Corporation of America will bene-
fit. HCA operates the largest chain of for-profit hospitals in the country, but
can't make enough money when Medicare is public without resorting to
fraud. The company has paid a total of $1.7 billion in fines for overcharging
Medicare and Medicaid, the largest fraud settlement in the nation's history.
The company was formed by a Mr. Thomas Frist. One of his sons, Thomas
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Jr., earned $160 million a year as CEO. Another son, William, has a $26
million interest in HCA, Inc., and he is the majority leader of the United
States Senate. Health care corporations and PAC's have contributed more
than $2 million to William Frist's campaigns. It was Mr. Frist who engi-
neered a provision in the Homeland Security Bill shielding the Eli Lilly
drug company from liability lawsuits. Lilly contributed $1.6 million to Sen-
ate election campaigns in the 2000 election cycle, 79% to Republicans. And
so forth.
The policy tools of neoliberalism serve corporate interests extremely
well: marketizing and deregulating insert policy-drivers into various mar-
kets or open new ones, and privatizing almost invariably shifts public assets
and values directly into corporate hands. In David Bollier's recent book,
Silent Theft: The Private Plunder of Our Common Wealth, the author refers
to this as "enclosing the commons," and details both the institutional
mechanisms and dozens of empirical examples.
Among the interlocking national network of neoliberal organizations,
two are located in Bozeman, Montana. One is the Foundation for Research
in Economics and the Environment, whose notable acronym is FREE.
Seven of the Diligent Dozen foundations support FREE-to the extent of
more than $2.5 million since 1987. FREE's major program illustrates the
intelligence, care, sophistication, and precision of the Diligent Dozen cam-
paign. FREE arranges and provides weeklong seminars advancing neolib-
eral thought, and the program is now entering its second decade. The semi-
nars are staged at upscale resorts near Bozeman, with plenty of leisure time
for trout fishing, trail rides, and cocktail hours. FREE invites the partici-
pants and their spouses, and pays all travel and lodging expenses. The par-
ticipants are federal judges.
The Property & Environmental Research Center (PERC) in Bozeman is
funded by nine of the Diligent Dozen foundations to the extent of more than
$4 million since 1987. The champion of "free market environmentalism,"
PERC aggressively advocates privatizing the federal lands for the bizarre
and absurd reason that they "lose money." The receipts collected do indeed
fall short of annual appropriations, as PERC claims. That can be seen as
"losing money," however, only by assuming a profit objective for the fed-
eral lands, and then doing some Arthur Anderson bookkeeping (in this case,
failing to account for externalized benefits). Since the first national park
was created 131 years ago, the statutory objectives for federal lands have
been exactly other than for profit, and for appropriations to be unmatched
by income is fully anticipated in any public enterprise. By the reasoning of
PERC, public libraries "lose money," and so does the Department of De-
fense.
Mr. Terry Anderson is the director of PERC, and an Adjunct Fellow at
the Cato Institute. As an author of the privatization report, How and Why to
Privatize the Federal Lands, he seems unable to comprehend the federal
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lands as anything but profit-seeking enterprises. This is not simple myopia,
and it is not peculiar to Mr. Anderson.
Discounting and disdaining public life is an insufferable and elitist char-
acteristic of neoliberalism, but if a free and democratic society wishes to
support a system of national parks, say, with public financing for public
enjoyment, it can, should, and will do so. Attacking their success is to at-
tack the free and democratic society, so only those fully confident in their
religious convictions about markets will attempt it. Mr. Anderson is suffi-
ciently confident in his convictions that he serves as a public lands advisor
to the Bush Administration, where his privatizing argument is warmly ap-
preciated.
Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton, who oversees the Parks Service,
reads from the same neoliberal page as Mr. Anderson. She has undertaken
what might be called an incremental privatization of the Agency, beginning
with its personnel. Ms. Norton proposes to eliminate nearly three-fourths of
the full time positions in the Parks Service, shifting them to the private sec-
tor. That's a start, but Mr. Anderson's colleague at PERC, Mr. Donald Leal,
is candid about the neoliberal objective. In the PERC Policy Series, Back to
the Future to Save Our Parks, he suggests cutting the National Park Service
appropriations eventually to zero.
The neoliberal attack on publicness is indeed an attack on democracy,
and the unhappy results are apparent. We have been pushed a long way
across the self-and-society continuum toward the law of the institutional
jungle, and the progressive social compact is dissolving. Slashing taxes
repeatedly has guaranteed the deterioration of public services and the ero-
sion in value of public assets. This simply encourages, in a vicious and
seemingly deliberate circle, more and more calls to privatize.
And deregulation has turned loose not competition, but greed. Deregu-
lated corporations-call them "neoliberalized"-savage their investors,
their suppliers, their employees, and society at large while enriching their
executives and their political patrons. Think Enron. Think about its cam-
paign contributions to George W. Bush and more than half the members of
Congress. Think Kenneth Lay as a director of the American Enterprise In-
stitute.
America's health care system is pathetic, as we have seen. Public educa-
tion languishes. The nation's highways and bridges are crumbling. Ten per-
cent of American families are malnourished. The federal lands lay in bio-
physical waste, and their public facilities are shameful. A space shuttle de-
signed for one hundred flights disintegrates after fifty. Cynicism and indif-
ference characterize the American voters, less than half of whom choose to
vote. The yawning gap in the distribution of wealth and incomes intensifies,
pitting the increasingly impoverished against the increasingly wealthy.
Sharp elbows become more apparent every day.
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